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Abstract-Various principles guiding the construction of mathematical models are 
isolated-selection of features to be considered in the model, character of time flow, 
character of space representation, determinism, causality, etc. It is shown how 
different choices of each of these items give rise to different classes of models-e.g., 
static vs dynamic, discrete time vs continuous time, lumped space vs distributed space, 
input-output systems vs stochastic systems, etc. Both causality and determinism are 
formalized in set theoretical terms. The validation problem of the models arrived at on 
deterministic-causal assumptions is dealt with along empiricist lines, the need for 
considering stochastic models emerging out of these considerations. A critical 
examination of determinism is given, out of which results the contention that deter- 
minism in a model merely expresses an attitude of the modeller towards the real world 
rather than an intrinsic property of a real system. Finally the conventional character of 
determinism is seen to be shared by the various other principles guiding the activity of 
the modeller, principles whose adoption is justified or invalidated only in terms of the 
comparison of the resulting model’s predictions with actual observations. 
1. METHODOLOGY OF MATHEMATICAL MODELLING 
Whenever epistemological (science) or decisional (engineering) studies are undertaken, 
great care has to be exercised in securing good descriptions of the real system of 
interest. A language is required for that purpose, and mathematics has proven to be a 
very valuable aid in this respect. A mathematical model of a real system is a description 
of that system given within mathematics. Its elaboration requires a careful process of 
translation which consists of associating mathematical objects (i.e., sets and functions) 
with each of the relevant aspects of the system of interest. 
There is no unique way of achieving that translation, the actual outcome being 
ultimately an expression of the tastes, feelings, previous experience, etc., of the trans- 
lator (applied mathematician). However, the translator must endeavour to “preserve the 
structure” of the real system-the more so, the better-with the aim of obtaining faithful 
translations. 
There is a group of principles guiding this activity. Each of them requires making 
decisions as to how time, space, and the various processes assumed to take place in 
space and time are to be represented in the description. These decisions refer to the 
following: 
(a) TIME: Does it flow or remain static? If it does flow, is time flow continuous or 
discrete? 
(b) SPACE: Is it distributed or lumped? 
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(c) PROCESSES: Which of them do take place? Is there any causal link between them? 
If so, is it deterministic or not? 
The outcome of these decisions will dictate the choice of the various sets composing the 
structure 
(7’7 S, A, J-5 W, (1.1) 
where each of these sets is nonempty, and they have the following meanings: 
(i) T represents time, and 
1. T = (0) means time is regarded as static; 
2. (0) 4 T C Z means time flows in a discrete fashion; 
3. T is an interval of real numbers when time flows in a continuous fashion. 
(ii) S represents space, and 
1. “S is open in some Euclidean space of dimension d 2 1” means space is 
distributed, of dimension d ; 
2. “S is finite” means space is lumped. 
In the distributed case, S inherits the Euclidean topological structure of Rd, whereas it is 
regarded as a directed graph in the lumped case. In either case aS (the boundary of S) 
represents the interface system surroundings, the combined whole being represented by 
the union of S and its boundary, called the closure of S and denoted by 3. 
(iii) A represents the values of the attributes of the system, whose spatial-temporal 
variation constitutes a process. 
(iv) At each instant of time the attribute values are to be specified at each point of the 
closure of S, by means of a function e : s + A to be called a profile. E consists of 
all admissible profiles, i.e., those possessing appropriate analytical properties. 
(v) K? consists of functions o : T + E, o(t) being “the profile at time t,” for each 
t E T, also to be denoted by w,. The extent of class 0 is a consequence of 
limitations imposed by our knowledge of the various processes taking place in the 
real system. 
See [4] for a detailed illustration showing the construction of models like (1.1) under 
various assumptions, as well as a completion of such structure arrived at by adopting an 
empiricist viewpoint concerning the assignment of probabilities. 
It must be noted that the classification of models implicit in the preceding description 
of the various elements of model (2.1) is far from being exhaustive. In fact, when 
modelling complex systems, it can happen that some parts of it are modelled with 
distributed space and some are not, some aspects are modelled deterministically and some 
other aspects are not, etc., so that in general “mixed” models have to considered. 
The choice, however, is always open to the modeller, who is the only one to decide 
whether time is to be considered to flow or not, whether space is to be distributed or not, 
which processes are to be considered to actually take place, etc. The one and only 
limitation encountered by the modeller in this respect refers to the agreement of model 
predictions with actual observations on the real system: if considering a simple (say 
lumped space) model is not sufficient, the spatial distribution of the attributes should be 
considered instead; if assuming determinism does not lead to good predictions, try doing 
without that hypothesis, etc. 
In general, trying the simpler alternative first seems to be a sensible modelling 
policy-one goes up the ladder of complexity if it is so required by the experiment 
anyway. It sometimes happens, though, that an already built model is to be simplified in 
order to extract conclusions from it more economically. This shows that “going down 
the ladder of complexity” is an interesting operation on models too. For a systematic 
approach to model simplification the reader is referred to the algebraic theory given by 
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Zeigler in [12]. The next section will concentrate on exploring the role played by 
determinism and causality in mathematical models. 
2. CAUSALITY AND DETERMINISM IN 
MATHEMATICAL MODELS 
Classically, the main problem associated with a model like that in (1.1) is that of 
“given present information plus whichever extra requirements are to be met, find future 
and past behaviour.” Normally, present information is given in the form of an obser- 
vation record over a certain time interval. Thus, a nonempty set TOC T has to be 
specified, together with an observation record wg E E To. As to the extra requirements to 
be imposed, they normally refer to the action of the external world upon the real system 
under study and often can be embodied in a family {B,, t E T} of sets of profiles, with the 
requirement that only those time evolutions w should be considered for which oI E B, 
for each time instant t E T. For the sake of illustration, suppose the real system is a 
metal rod one meter in length in which heat conduction is taking place. It is customary to 
take T = R, S = (0, 1) and A = R, so that E consists of real functions e defined on [0, 1] 
(temperature profiles). If both ends of the rod are to be kept at zero degrees, the subset 
B of E defined by 
B = {e E E : e(0) = e(1) = 0) 
consists precisely of those profiles for which that happens, hence it is relevant. We can 
take B, = B for each t E T in this case, i.e., only those time evolutions o for which 
w{(O) = w,(l) = 0 should be taken into consideration. In general, the classical problem of 
prediction can be posed in the context given by model (1.1) as follows: 
Problem 2.1. Given TO C T, wg E ET0 and {B,, t E T}, with B, C E for each t E T, find 
o E fi such that 
(i) WITo= w0 
(ii) wt E B, for each t E T. 
Numerous problems in classical science and engineering can be cast in this fashion, 
normally in terms of the differential or difference equations specifying a, case in which 
(i) is known as the initial condition (and normally TO = {to}), whereas (ii) constitutes the 
boundary condition in most cases of interest. 
Let 
0, = {w E R : (i), (ii) hold}, 
i.e., R. is the solution set of Problem 2.1. If &, = 0, requirements (i) and (ii) are obviously 
excessive, and a logical analysis aimed at establishing the reasons for that incom- 
patibility is in order. If no consists of only one element (i.e., an existence and uniqueness 
theorem has been proved for Problem 2.1) then a “sensitivity analysis” is carried out as 
follows: let w’, a” E R be the (unique) solutions of Problem 2.1 corresponding to data 
o&{BI} and w&{B’:}, respectively. If the two sets of data “differ little,” will the 
corresponding solutions “differ little” too? The notion of “differing little” can be 
formalized in topological terms-i.e., distance-which transforms the question just 
posed into one referring to the continuity properties of the map 
i.e., continuity of the solution with respect to data. Then, if the last question can be 
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answered in the affirmative, Problem 2.1 is said to be well posed, a term originally coined 
by J. Hadamard in connection with partial differential equations [2]. This property of 
being well posed is highly significant, since it shows that the model is well behaved in the 
following sense: 
In practice, both initial and “boundary” conditions are known only approximately; 
continuity of solutions with respect to initial data means that the errors in the deter- 
mination of the system’s behaviour can be made as small as desired provided the errors 
in the data are kept sufficiently small. On the other hand, existence and uniqueness of 
solutions is a necessary prerequisite for even posing the question of continuity of 
solutions with respect to data. Moreover, it reflects a property frequently observed in 
real systems: there is only one behaviour compatible with initial data once the side 
conditions have been specified. This observation is the essence of determinism. 
Lastly, if R0 consists of more than one element (i.e., there is existence of solutions but 
uniqueness has been proved not to hold) then conditions (i) and (ii) in Problem 2.1 do not 
completely specify future behaviour, and this may indicate that the model is incomplete. 
This question will be given ample coverage in the next two sections, where model (1.1) 
will be appropriately supplemented in order to deal with nondeterministic situations, and 
later to review critically the notion of determinism. 
For the time being it will prove very useful to introduce the notion of causality, which 
will reinforce that of determinism in a very natural way. For suppose an existence and 
uniqueness theorem can be proved for Problem 2.1. It may happen that by fixing certain 
features of the model (say, by specifying the initial data), for every choice of time 
evolution of a certain part of the profiles (like boundary conditions, for example) there is 
one and only one time evolution for the remaining part of the profiles. This idea can be 
illustrated in more concrete terms by referring to a tank into which a liquid is being 
discharged at a certain rate, and out of which flow its contents through an orifice at the 
bottom: given the initial quantity of water in the tank, for every choice of feed rate there 
is only one possible time behaviour of the amount of liquid in the tank. 
In general, it is sometimes possible to identify E with the Cartesian product of two 
sets U and Y. 
E=UXY, 
so that E-valued functions are ordered pairs composed of a U-valued function and a 
Y-valued function, i.e., 
ET=UTxYT. 
It is convenient to define 
r = {y E UT : (y, n) E fl for some 7) E Y ‘} 
H = (7~ E Y T : (y, 7) E ii for some y E UT}. 
Then each w E Sz can be written as 
for suitable y E r, n E H. In other words, 
.ncrxEI. 
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Moreover, it is sometimes possible to find a nonempty set X-somehow associated with 
model (l.l)-with the following property: 
Causality 2.2. Given x E X, for each y E I there is one and only one n E H such that 
(%77)Efi. 
Then, there is said to be a causal link between those parts of the profiles contained in U 
and those contained in Y; equivalently, I is said to be the cause of H, and H is said to 
be the e#ect of I. In the usual systems theoretic terminology, the elements of I are 
called inputs, those of H are called outputs, and those of X (initial) states [12, p. 2051 or 
experiments [5, p. 111. Causality is equivalent to the existence of a function fx : r + H for 
each x E X, with fx(r) = output obtained when input y is fed into the system if its initial 
state was x. 
Of particular interest is the causal relation in which the effect does not anticipate the 
cause. In fact, this lack of anticipation is what ultimately enables us to define an order in 
time (see 19, 0211). This feature of causality can be reflected by the functions mapping 
inputs into outputs if each of them is nonanticipative in the sense of the following 
definition, in which 
(2.3) 
is the time interval between s and t. One writes T’ and ‘It instead of T1 and T;“, 
respectively. 
Definition 2.4. Let s E T, cp :r-+ H be given. cp is said to be s-nonanticipative if, for 
each t E ‘I”, 
n’(t) = n”(t) if $1~; = ~“lrf (2.4) 
whichever inputs y’, y” E I are chosen, with n’ = cp(y’), n” = ~(7”). cp is nonanticipative if 
it is -w-nonanticipative. 
In other words, under a nonanticipative fx the effect at a given instant depends only on 
the cause prior to that instant, with no dependence whatsoever on its future. 
Therefore, under causality, model (1.1) specializes into the structure 
(T, u, r, Y, H, cfx, X E Xh (2.5) 
which is called a dynamical (input-output) system [5, p. lo], if each fx is nonan- 
ticipative. Family cfx, x E X} is termed the input-output relation of the system. Observe 
that a causal model (input-output system) is deterministic in the sense that once the 
initial state is fixed there is one and only one output for each choice of input, hence only 
one trajectory of the system. 
3. MODEL VALIDATION 
The purpose of modelling reaches well beyond constructing a structure like (1.1) or 
(2.5): it aims at choosing one such model that faithfully reproduces observed behaviour, 
i.e., a “valid” model. In short, our point of view will be empiricist, in the sense that a 
model can be validated only through successful comparison of its predictions with 
experiment. The following paragraphs are aimed at rendering precise this notion, i.e., 
that of a model like (2.5) being “successfully compared with experiment.” 
Classically (e.g., see [12, p. 1951) a model like (2.5) will be regarded as valid if the 
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following situation holds for every choice of set of observation instants T,, test input y, 
and corresponding observation record 77,: 
Let T, c T be given, its elements representing those instants at which output values are 
measured. Pick y E r and let r)l E Y TV be the output values recorded during the 
experiment in which the real system is subjected to input y. Then, there is an initial state 
x E X such that 
q IT, = 71 (3.1’) 
with 
rl = fArI. (3.1”) 
Note, however, that this validation criterion is rather strict, and in practice it is often 
replaced by one of approximate validation in which equality in (3.1) is replaced by 
“being approximately equal.” This concept can be formalized in terms of a tolerance 
given in the form of a positive number p, ql and 77 IT, being approximately equal if they 
di$er by less than p, this last notion being in turn formalizable in terms of a distance 
function d, defined on YTl. This gives rise to the condition 
as the counterpart of (3.1) for approximate validation. Needless to say, both p and dl are 
supplied by the modeller. 
Moreover, it happens in practice that successive repetitions of the same experiment 
“measuring the system’s response to input y over the time interval T,” have different 
outcomes, say ~1’). .7-j\ N), if N denotes the number of repetitions of the same experi- 
ment. It should not be surprising then that often not all of the “approximate equality 
conditions” 
ddv’i’), rl ITJ < P . . . ddqtN’v rl IT,) < P 
will hold. However, if k of them happen to be true and “k/N is close to unity,” say 
l-e<klN51 (3.3’) 
with E given beforehand (and “small,” as a rule), then the discrepancy will be attributed 
to “experimental error” and henceforth ignored. Quotient k/N is referred to as the 
relative frequency of occurrence of the validation condition (3.2) during the N repeti- 
tions of the experiments, and will be denoted by fN, i.e., 
fN =&. 
But, what happens if (3.3’) does not hold, as is sometimes the case? Again, fN is 
“small,” say 
OsfN <E, (3.3”) 
then there should be no objection to rejecting the approximate equality (3.2) of model 
prediction and observation record over TI, hence the model should be regarded as 
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invalid. Again, the choice of E in an actual situation falls under the sole responsibility of 
the modeller. 
But, what if fN is neither close to zero nor close to unity, say E 5 fN < 1 - E? Again, 
considerations connected with experiment give us a clue as to what to do. For, it is an 
often confirmed fact that as the number N of repetitions of the same experiment grows, 
the relative frequency fluctuates about a number (Y E [0, 11, the amplitudes of the 
fluctuations decreasing as more and more repetitions of the same experiment are 
considered. This observation embodies a generalization from empirical evidence, and 
forms the basis for the assignation of probabilities from an empiricist position (see [8]). 
Retaking our main discussion, a sensible thing to do is to associate this value (Y with the 
validation condition (3.2), or rather with the set of output trajectories that satisfy it, 
namely, 
C = (7’ E H : dl($ IT,, “-I IT,) < 6)). (3.4) 
On a strict basis, a model is valid if and only if for each Tr and for each y E r there is an 
x E X such that (Y is “close to 1”; it is invalid otherwise, i.e., if there is a choice of T1 and y 
such that for no choice of initial state x, a! happens to be “close to 1.” Here the phrase “being 
close to 1” has to be given a meaning, a possibility being “lying between 1 - E and 1,” as in 
(3.3’). 
Note that, strictly speaking, the validation of a model according to this scheme 
requires conducting “a large number” N of experiments for each choice of T1 and y, 
plus being able to find the right initial state for each such choice. This is rather difficult in 
practice, and actually impossible to achieve if either T or r is an infinite set, since only a 
finite number of experiments can at most be expected to be performed in any situation. 
Thus, it is easy to convince ourselves that the decision of labelling a model as valid or 
invalid will have to be made on the basis of restricted information, and in any case will 
involve an appeal to induction. 
Moreover, the actual technique presented here is rather simple minded, it being aimed 
not at furnishing a practical validation procedure, but rather at providing a conceptual 
framework for model validation in terms as simple as possible. In practice, model 
validation requires the concourse of statistical techniques of various kinds (notably 
hypothesis testing and parameter estimation), our simple minded consideration of 
“limiting values of relative frequencies” being an elementary instance of a statistical 
notion. 
Note, however, a very fundamental point: it suffices to show the slightest regard for 
experimental results to make the modeller resort to nondeterministic considerations in 
order to validate a deterministic model. In fact, no modeller would seriously attempt to 
validate a deterministic model like (2.5) by following the dictates of the validation criterion 
centered around (3.1) or even (3.2), certainly not if he is willing to face the fact that 
repetitions of the same experiment do not always give the same results. By so doing, the 
modeller should learn the lesson that the class of deterministic models is much too 
restricted. A meaningful, self-consistent validation theory requires a larger class of models, 
stochastic models providing one such choice. 
4. STOCHASTIC MODELS 
Suppose no valid deterministic model has been found for a certain real system. 
Whether such a state of affairs should be regarded as being peculiar to the real system 
being considered or simply as a measure of our ignorance of such system will not be 
dwelled upon for the time being-see Sec. 6, however. In such a case, a model like (1.1) 
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will have to be considered in which Problem 2.1 cannot be solved uniquely, namely one 
in which determinism is not reflected. 
Now, observe that determinism can be subsumed into causality as given in statement 
2.2 provided one can take 
x=ETo 
and, assuming 
E=UxY 
hence 
RCrxH 
as before, set 
B, = {y(t)) x Y 
in Problem 2.1 for fixed y E r. In this setting, the fact that model (1.1) does not reflect 
determinism specializes into X not qualifying as “set of initial states.” In other words, 
there are “initial data” x E X and inputs y E r for which there are at least two distinct 
elements w’, w” of fi such that 
and both conditions 
WI IT,, = x = b.,” IT,, 
0; = (y(t), y’) for some y’E Y 
~0:’ =(y(t), y”) for some y” E Y 
hold for each t E T. 
Again rephrasing the same statement, for such a set of initial data x the assignment 
y* 7 is not a function, contrary to the statement of 2.2. What could replace the 
functions present in the input-output relation of model (2.5) arrived at under the 
assumption of deterministic causality? 
At this point the approach adopted in the previous section will prove to be very 
fruitful. For, observe that not only conditions such as (3.2) can be checked through 
experiment. In general, a set of “output records” B C YT1 can be given, and whether 
r) IT,EB (4.1) 
can be checked in exactly the same fashion in every repetition of the experiment. Note 
that (4.1) specializes to (3.4) if 
B = (7 E YT’: d,(r)‘, ‘q IT,) < PI. 
In turn, condition (4.1) defines a set of output trajectories 
c = {q E H : ‘q (T, E B}, (4.2) 
a set that can be assigned a probability by repeating the experiment in question a “large 
number” of times and identifying the limiting value (Y E [0, l] of the relative frequency 
with which condition (4.1) has occurred. Thus, every set of the form (4.2)-usually 
referred to as a cylinder set in H-can be assigned a probability through experiment. 
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This observation constitutes a clue for the construction of models from empirical 
data. In fact, if T denotes the class of all cylinder sets of H, the experiment provides (at 
least conceptually) an assignation of probabilities C-a defined on the whole of V. 
Recalling that this assignation is made for fixed y E I, then a stochastic model results by 
associating with every y E I the corresponding assignment of probabilities to the 
cylinder sets in H. This correspondence constitutes the required generalization of the 
input-output relation of (2.5) to a nondeterministic situation. 
Under certain conditions, for each input y E I the corresponding probabilization of 
the cylinder sets in H can be extended to a larger class X that contains Ce, in such a 
way that the resulting probabilization of the sets in X can be called a probability in the 
technical sense of the term (see [7, 11). A very important result pointing definitely in the 
direction of asserting the feasibility of this empiricist approach is a theorem due to the 
Soviet mathematician A. N. Kolmogoroff, the much celebrated consistency theorem [7]. 
See Sec. 3 of [4] in this connection. 
Thus, a stochastic model is arrived at by assigning a probability distribution on the 
output space H to every input y. This correspondence reduces to an H-valued function 
when each of the probability distributions associated with the inputs is concentrated at a 
single point y of H-the output corresponding to the input being considered. Thus, the 
class of stochastic models contains the class of input-output systems as a subclass. The 
reader is referred to Sec. 3 of [3] for a technical presentation of these ideas, one that 
incorporates an extension of the notion of nonanticipativity in causality that is applicable 
in this more general context. 
5. CONVENTIONALISM IN MODELLING 
This section responds to the need of placing in a proper perspective the various 
modelling principles referred to in Sec. 1. To begin with, the principle of determinism 
will be examined in the light of the following examples: 
Example 5.1. Consider the free fall of a coin from a certain height. Three aspects of this 
phenomenon will be isolated here: the initial position of the coin, its free fall time, and 
the side showing upwards once the coin is in rest. Note that the first of these three 
aspects can be externally controlled, as opposed to the remaining two which can only be 
observed. On the other hand, experiment gives results such as 
Repetition 1 2 3 4 5 
Time (set) 1.80 1.85 1.75 1.80 1.80 
Side 1 0 0 1 1 
corresponding to the experiment in which a coin is released from a point 16 m above the 
ground, with side = l(0) if heads (tails) comes up. 
Experiments similar to the one just described give rise to the suspicion that for a given 
initial height the falling time can be predicted with great accuracy. In fact, the average 
value of the five values of falling time recorded in Table 1 is 1.80 set, with a maximum 
deviation of 2.88% with respect to this value. This is a small figure, so small that we feel 
tempted to neglect it and assume instead that “falling time is a function of height,” the 
observed variability being explained away in terms of “experimental error.” 
Experimenting with various height values yields the law that “the falling time is 
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proportional to the square root of the initial height.” This piece of information suggests 
that a reasonable model could be cast in the shape of an input-output system with 
T = {l}, U = Y = [0, m), I = U, H = Y, x = { 1) 
and input-output function f : U + Y given by 
f(u) = kq/u 
with k > 0 and f(u) = falling time when coin is released from height u. This model is 
easily validated in practice, provided the proportionality constant k is chosen ap- 
propriately (k = 0.452 set/m* for experiments conducted at sea level). 
On the other hand, consider the other aspect of this phenomenon (“heads or tails”) or 
rather its dependence with height. If it is to be modelled by an input-output system, it 
must have 
z = (0, 1) 
as output space and an input-output function g : U + Z, all the remaining ingredients in 
(T, U, r, Z, Z, g> 
retaining their meaning. Noting that 
u = g_‘(O) + g-‘(l), 
such a model would predict that the coin definitely falls heads when dropped from 
certain well-specified heights, the outcome being invariably tails in any other case. As 
already noted, these predictions are far from being confirmed by experiment hence a 
model of this type could not possibly be validated under reasonable criteria. In short. we 
are led to conclude that this side of the phenomenon being analyzed is nondeterministic. 
A stochastic model for it consists essentially of a probability on Z, namely, 
with p = probability of heads. 
The conclusion to be drawn from these results seems to be that there is a causal 
deterministic link from height to falling time, whereas no such situation arises if “falling 
time” is replaced by “side,” at least not in general. Note, however, that p can be found 
to be “very close to 1” for a particular coin (a highly biased one), a case in which a 
deterministic model with g(u) = 1 for all u E U could well be validated. On the other 
hand, recall that the existence of an input-output function like f or g was validated on 
the grounds that “the relative deviation of the results with respect to their average value 
was very small,” yet that variability in the results simply could not be ignored under 
certain conditions. 
For example, suppose the experiments are carried out for small heights only, say a 
few centimeters, time being measured using a not very precise clock, so that precision to 
within one second simply cannot be guaranteed. Possible results for the experiment in 
which the coin is released from a height of 50 cm are as follows: 
Repetition 1 2 3 4 5 
Time (set) 1 0 0 1 1 
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Thus, under these conditions, no deterministic model could be reasonably validated for 
this aspect of the phenomenon being considered. 
Example 5.2. Suppose we are interested in studying radioactive disintegrations. If the 
investigation is carried out on a “long term” basis (say hours) the experimental facilities 
could very well consist of a watch and a scale, weight losses becoming appreciable for 
this duration of the experiment. This is not so when this phenomenon is studied on a 
short term basis (say a few seconds), this situation requiring a good chronometer and a 
Geiger counter. Experiment shows that this phenomenon appears distinctly deterministic 
when viewed on a long term basis, determinism vanishing when studied in the second 
experimental setup. See Sec. 2 of [3] for a more detailed presentation of these 
considerations. 
These two examples indicate that the same phenomenon may appear to be deterministic 
when examined from a certain perspective, and yet lose this characteristic when viewed 
differently. Moreover, both observer and observation scale seem to play a prominent 
role in this assessment. 
This observation leads us to conclude that determinism is not an attribute that can 
safely be said to be possessed by certain parts of the real world and not by certain other 
portions of it. It is rather a property of the (mathematical) model used to describe the 
real system, a property resulting from basic assumptions made by the modeller on the 
phenomenon in question, and whose justification or invalidations comes ultimately from 
the confrontation between model predictions and experimental results. This point of 
view concerning determinism is akin to the conuentionalistic approach concerning the 
axioms of geometry developed by PoincarC (see [lo, p. 501, for example) and can be said 
to supplement it. 
This conventional character is by no means peculiar to this modelling principle only. 
Take the choice of time set in (1. l), for example. Surely a basic requirement on any 
candidate for T is that it should be an ordered set, since otherwise it would not be 
possible to speak of “past,” “present” and “future” in terms of it. The requirement 
imposed by the continuity of time flow seems to be that “there should be no consecutive 
events” or, in other words, “between any two events there conceivably occurs a third 
event.” An interval of rational numbers could well qualify as time set under these 
conditions, no doubt, yet intervals of real numbers are chosen instead simply on account 
of the more convenient analytical properties of R, i.e., the possibility of taking limits. On 
the other hand, given the precision offered by most time measuring devices, no empirical 
arguments of any kind could be used to justify the need for including irrationals in T. In 
fact, for a given accuracy, only finitely many rational time values will ever have to be 
considered, so time might just as well be regarded to flow in a discrete fashion, thus 
erasing the dividing line between both types of time flow. It seems to be that, in the last 
resort, the type of time flow incorporated in a model results from considerations of 
convenience only. Moreover, why should time be assumed to flow at all? Why not 
consider a static model instead? Again, a certain phenomenon can be safely regarded to 
be static when examined in a “short-term” basis, yet considering the same phenomenon 
on a “long-term” basis may require assuming time to flow if a good model is to be 
arrived at. Needless to say, both “short” and “long” have to be made precise at each 
modelling instance, this requiring an appeal to experience. Again we have to face 
another modelling principle bearing a conventional character: it is only the confrontation 
of a model’s predictions with experiment that validates or invalidates a certain choice for 
T in (l.l), and a valid choice may become invalid if the experimental conditions are 
changed. 
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Similar arguments can be used to show that the choice of all the other elements in 
(1.1) obeys equally conventional modelling principles. These points are illustrated in a 
particular context in 141, where various choices of space and time representation are 
illustrated. 
It appears convenient to conclude at this stage by pointing out two types of 
consideration usually made when choosing the various elements making up a model like 
(1.1): 
(a) 
(b) 
Purpose of the model. Once the attributes of interest have been identified and sets A 
and S have been chosen, the choice of E often results from reasons of analytical 
convenience. However, its factorization into factors U and Y results from identify- 
ing those parts of the profiles that can be acted upon externally (U) and those that 
can only be observed (Y). Different experimental setups would obviously manifest 
in different choices for these sets. 
State of knowledge. The amount of knowledge the modeller has on the real system 
imposes restrictions on the time evolution of the profiles. It makes the modeller 
require certain relations to hold (e.g., conservation laws, constitutive relations, etc.), 
thus dictating the choice of R. Modellers differing in this respect might choose 
differently. 
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